Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. ensure an effective homeland defense and homeland security effort should understand the implications of a successful HEMP attack on the United States, the factors that influence the probability of an attack, and continuously seek innovative ways to prevent such an attack from ever occurring, and simultaneously, to prepare for it, if preventative efforts should fail.
Those interested in the efforts to ensure an effective homeland defense and homeland security effort should understand the implications of a successful HEMP attack on the United States, the factors that influence the probability of an attack, and continuously seek innovative ways to prevent such an attack from ever occurring, and simultaneously, to prepare for it, if preventative efforts should fail. 6 The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology --when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends --and we will oppose them with all our power.
? President Bush West Point New York June 1, 2002 This paper describes how a nuclear weapon would create a HEMP. Next, a brief description of the effect of a HEMP attack on electrical and electronic systems followed by an overview of the implications of the failure of these systems on the nation's critical infrastructure and elements of national power. A discussion of the risks of such an attack will be followed by an overview of the on-going contributions of the existing NSS and NSHS to prevent and prepare for a HEMP attack. This paper will conclude with some broad recommendations to strengthen the United States' capabilities to prevent, and simultaneously prepare to mitigate and recover from, the effects of this ultimate form of asymmetric attack. To properly appreciate the implications for homeland defense and homeland security however, it is first necessary to begin by defining what an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is.
HIGH ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is defined by the Technology Division of the National Communications System as a wide frequency range, high-intensity, extremely rapid, and short duration burst of electromagnetic energy which produces electric and magnetic fields which can couple to metallic conductors associated with electrical and electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges. 7 A noted expert in the field of nuclear weapons and EMP effects, Dr. Lowell Wood, characterized EMP as being similar to "…very intense static electricity that is carried on radio-frequency electromagnetic waves." 8 Although EMP may be produced by both nuclear and non-nuclear means, this paper will concentrate on an EMP created by a high altitude nuclear detonation.
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In general, a nuclear EMP is caused by the interaction of high energy nuclear radiation with atoms in the atmosphere. 10 At altitudes above approximately 40 km, the EMP component becomes particularly significant due to the large volume of the atmosphere underneath the exploding weapon that is available to interact with the high energy nuclear radiation. According to Dr. Wood, the nuclear weapon's high energy nuclear radiations interact with the air molecules and essentially transform the atmosphere underneath the explosion into a gigantic radiotransmitter antenna.
FIGURE 1. HEMP GENERATION MECHANISM 12
Dr. Gary Smith, as the Director of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, testified that there are two overriding characteristics that make a HEMP attack unique. 13 These characteristics are of particular interest to those concerned with an effective homeland defense and homeland security. First, the area affected by the EMP signal can be continental in scope.
As the altitude of the detonation increases, the area in line of sight to the radiation and, therefore subjected to direct EMP effects, also increases. 14 For a detonation altitude of approximately 500 km, the entire continental United States, and portions of Canada and Mexico would be affected (although at the edges of the area, the field intensity would be about half of the peak levels and the field strength would not be uniform over the entire area).
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The second HEMP characteristic of interest is that the peak electromagnetic field amplitude and the speed at which it increases are extremely high. 16 Although EMP has often been compared to a lightning strike, this is only useful as an illustrative comparison to understand the scale of some of the effects. There are significant differences. For example, HEMP has several phases, each generated by different effects of the nuclear weapon. 17 Each of the phases has unique characteristics and poses different protection challenges. Also, EMP FIGURE 2. HEMP SURFACE COVERAGE 18 generated by an exoatmospheric nuclear explosion develops its peak electrical field much faster than lightning, making it harder to protect against. 19 Finally, lightning is a localized event while the implications of a continental-sized electromagnetic field create unique propagation effects.
Since an electromagnetic field interacts with a metallic conductor to induce currents to flow through them, any metallic object (such as power lines, local area network cables, or even plumbing) can act as an antenna which gathers in the EMP signal and converts it to current flow. 20 Long-line conductors such as power lines and metallic communication cables can further extend these currents throughout and beyond the area illuminated by the line-of-sight HEMP effects. The direct and indirect electromagnetic coupling effects are the means by which an EMP signal generated by a high altitude nuclear detonation can cause near-instantaneous, potentially damaging voltages and currents in unprotected electronic circuits and components throughout an entire continental-sized area.
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Modern electronics and computer systems are extensively based on semiconductorbased integrated circuit technology, and various other circuits and devices. Due to the exceptional sensitivity of modern electronics to relatively small amounts of energy, the extreme voltages and/or current spikes produced by an EMP event can upset and even create irreversible damage to unshielded or specially designed electronic and computer devices. This is why a HEMP attack is so potentially catastrophic for the United States -it is the most electronically dependent nation in the world.
CONSEQUENCES OF A HEMP ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES HOMELAND
A detailed prediction of all of the potential effects of a successful HEMP attack is very difficult due to the complexity of the interdependent systems, the diverse environments throughout the effected areas, and the uncertainties associated with the manner of nuclear weapon employment. While EMP and its associated effects on various devices and equipment have been the subject of intense scrutiny for over forty years, much of the earlier testing and analysis was focused on Department of Defense nuclear command and control and strategic weapons systems. As a result, much of the material produced about EMP was highly classified. Clearly, the United States is vulnerable and the consequences of such an attack are unacceptable. However, the existence of exceptional vulnerability does not necessarily equate to risk. An assessment of the probability of a HEMP attack on the homeland of the United
States is required to determine the relative degree of risk that exists.
ASSESSING THE RISK
When considering potential threats, a risk assessment must be conducted to gain an appreciation for the likelihood of the event of concern occurring. This is necessary to provide a basis to ensure the correct amount of national resources are provided to reduce the likelihood of the event occurring or the severity of its impact. The following paragraphs will first evaluate the current nuclear proliferation environment and provide a broad assessment of the availability of suitable delivery capabilities. This will provide a basis to judge the likelihood of a HEMP attack.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Although it is a gross generalization, for the purposes of this estimate, the reader can assume that essentially every nuclear weapon will produce infrastructure-significant EMP effects when detonated at high altitude. This section of the assessment will provide a brief overview of known and suspected nuclear powers and conclude with a discussion of on-going proliferation developments to frame the potential threat. Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) stated that although Syria is a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty, broader access to foreign expertise warrants concern about Syria's nuclear intentions. 29 Of the remaining nations that either had established programs, or had advocated the development of nuclear weapons, only three were widely considered to be actively seeking nuclear weapons: Iraq, Libya, and Iran.
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There have obviously been substantial developments over the last year in the arena of nuclear proliferation with regard to these three nations. Two of the nations that have been regarded as actively seeking nuclear weapons, Iraq and Libya, have been interdicted. Analysis of the intentions and methodologies of their programs is on-going and will likely provide valuable knowledge about other nation's weapons efforts and nuclear technology proliferation in general.
However, some other recent proliferation developments warrant particularly careful attention.
First, Iran has confirmed the existence of a substantial uranium weapons-grade material processing capability. 31 Although the International Atomic Energy Agency trumpeted the announcement that Iran has signed the additional protocol on nuclear safeguards in December 2003, doubts remain as to the extent of Iran's future cooperation with full verification measures (as well as the efficacy of those inspections). 32 Thus, the full extent and the maturity of Iran's nuclear weapons program remain unknown.
The second proliferation development that warrants careful attention is the exposure of a highly efficient and organized international "proliferation for profit" effort. The acknowledged extent and activities of the Pakistani "Kahn Network" is particularly troubling. The interception while enroute from Malaysia to Libya of equipment (of Pakistani specification) destined to be used for uranium refinement is just one example. 35 The final area of significant proliferation concern remains the access to existing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-grade material by nations and others interested in possessing nuclear weapons. A recent article in the New York Times reiterates the fact that the refinement of weapons-grade material is not a simple matter and that the production of atomic weapons was still a complex undertaking. 36 This creates an extensive demand for states and others with nuclear ambitions to obtain complete nuclear weapons or weapons-grade materiel. Although any nation with fissile materials or nuclear weapons is potentially a source, Russia, the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (NIS), and her former satellite nations remain a particularly significant proliferation concern due to the economic turmoil, massive stockpiles of fissile materials, inadequate nuclear storage security, and continuing susceptibility to demandside diversion. 39 The transfer of operational missile systems was also cited as a specific concern. Similarly, the Rumsfeld Commission specifically identified several countries that were pursuing a sea launch capability (a troubling aspect of this development is the increased difficulty of correctly assigning responsibility for such an attack). 40 This development was recognized as expanding the potential threat envelope to shorter range missiles such as the Scud series. 41 Within this framework of missile proliferation uncertainty, an overview of nations assessed to possess nuclear capable ballistic missiles is in order.
Of the existing nuclear armed nations that are currently of concern, Russia and China 
UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES
The mutually supporting National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) provide an integrated, comprehensive, strategic framework that simultaneously seeks to create and seize opportunities that strengthen national security and prosperity as well as provide a secure foundation for on-going global engagement. 45 Central features of both of these strategies either directly contribute to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the United States homeland or establish suitable frameworks to enable national preparedness, should a HEMP attack occur. A brief review of the elements of the NSS and NSHS supports this assertion.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY CONTRIBUTIONS
Two of the central objectives of the NSS are to "strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism" and "work to prevent attacks against the United States and its friends and to prevent the enemies of the United States from threatening it or its allies and friends with WMD." 46 Many of the initiatives that support these objectives directly and indirectly contribute the prevention of a HEMP attack on the United States homeland.
Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks
The NSS recognizes the dangers created by the nexus between terrorists, state sponsors of terrorism, and WMD. 47 The Al-Qaeda organization was widely understood to be seeking WMD and remains a target of particular interest to the United States. 48 The continued interdiction of their sanctuaries, the United States' explicit elimination of the distinction between terrorists and those who knowing aid or harbor them, and the emphasis on the prevention of the transfer of WMD and their means of delivery to terrorist organizations are contributing directly to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the United States by state-supported terrorists.
The NSS framework also seeks to prevent the use of WMD through the execution of three broad elements: counter-proliferation, non-proliferation, and effective consequence management. There have been substantial developments in the execution of each that contribute to the efforts to prevent a HEMP attack on the United States.
Counter-proliferation
Ongoing proactive nuclear and ballistic missile counter-proliferation efforts are providing substantial dividends that contribute to the prevention of a HEMP attack. First, the intelligence efforts to unmask the extent of the nuclear proliferation network created by Dr. Kahn provide an excellent example of on-going initiatives to strengthen counter-proliferation efforts through a more robust and effective set of detection capabilities. 49 Similarly, the decision to implement an earlier deployment of an initial ground-based interceptor and improved ballistic missile tracking capabilities will support the improved passive and active defenses called for in the NSS. 50 
Non-proliferation
Another initiative specified in the NSS that is contributing to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the United States homeland is the continuing emphasis on strengthened nonproliferation efforts. For example, although the Bush administration initially decreased the emphasis and associated funding of threat reduction assistance to Russia in 2002, the funding was replaced and increased by Congress and the following year fully supported by the Bush administration.
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Strengthened non-proliferation diplomatic efforts have also been successful. One particularly promising multilateral diplomatic initiative has been the development of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 53 The PSI combines the efforts of eleven countries to combat trafficking to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern of WMD, their delivery means, and related materials. 54 The PSI provides the multilateral framework that supports another non-proliferation initiative identified in the NSS: interdiction. The countries participating in the PSI agree to interdict the transfer or transport to and from states (and non-state actors) of proliferation concern of WMD, their delivery systems or related materials, either domestically or internationally. 55 Although aimed at the entire range of WMD, this interdiction protocol contributes to the prevention of a HEMP attack by seeking to curb the free transport of nuclear technologies, weapons and ballistic missile systems.
Consequence Management
The final portion of the NSS framework that seeks to prevent the use of WMD on the United States, its allies, or its friends is effective consequence management. 56 Effective consequence management, although primarily a preparedness concept, also contributes to the prevention of a HEMP attack. By seeking to minimize the effects of WMD on its people and those of allied and friendly nations, consequence management contributes to deterrence by demonstrating to the enemies of the United States that their WMD acquisition and employment strategies will not be worth the risks.
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The most significant contribution to the concept of an effective consequence management strategy has been the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the implementation of a comprehensive national homeland security strategy. A brief review of some of the on-going DHS initiatives will illuminate some of the efforts that are underway and which are creating an effective framework to pursue national preparedness from the effects of a HEMP attack.
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS
The July 2002 NSHS is the first-ever national homeland security strategy and it provides the initial framework to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks. 58 The three strategic objectives of this strategy are to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. 59 Since the DHS is a relatively new organization and is faced with an immense task of avoiding the expectation that it must try and defend everything, everywhere, all at once, it is reasonable to find that its on-going initiatives do not specifically concentrate on direct protection against a HEMP attack. However, of the six critical mission areas created by the strategy, two of them offer a promising framework to reduce the vulnerability of the United States to HEMP attacks. The following paragraphs will provide an overview of these two particular mission areas and highlight on-going initiatives that may contribute now and in the future to a more effective preparedness against a HEMP attack.
Protecting Critical Infrastructure And Key Assets
The NSHS recognizes that the United States' society and its modern way of life are dependent on networks of physical and virtual infrastructures. 60 Of the eight major initiatives to protect these assets, systems, and functions, five develop organizational or procedural frameworks that will contribute to the preparedness of the United States against the effects of a HEMP attack. The following paragraphs highlight some of the contributions made in each of these areas. The NSHS also specifies that a key role of the DHS will be to build and maintain a complete critical infrastructure assessment. 63 This comprehensive, up-to-date analysis of the vulnerabilities and preparedness of key points across the critical infrastructure centers is designed to permit the DHS to match current threat information against current vulnerabilities to efficiently direct the appropriate actions. 64 As with the initiative to unify critical infrastructure responsibilities, this framework will enable DHS personnel to determine the appropriate critical infrastructure systems that need to be protected against HEMP effects as well as a means to track the accomplishment of vulnerability reduction.
Another key initiative that supports preparedness to mitigate and recover from the effects of a HEMP attack is the effort by the DHS to enable effective partnerships with state and local governments and the private sector. 65 As with the other elements, this initiative does not provide direct improvements in the effort to prepare the United States homeland against the effects of a HEMP attack. However, by establishing effective mechanisms for the federal, state and local governments to effectively partner with the private sector, the groundwork through which specific HEMP-related infrastructure improvements may be introduced, has been laid.
The next homeland security critical mission area that creates a mechanism that will be essential to the preparation to reduce infrastructure vulnerabilities to a HEMP attack is the development of a national infrastructure protection plan. This plan provides the methodology for "…identifying and prioritizing critical assets, systems, and functions, and for sharing protection responsibility with state and local government and the private sector." 66 The effort to establish standards and benchmarks for the protection of critical infrastructure will be invaluable as the mechanism for the prioritization of appropriate HEMP hardening measures.
The final initiative to protect critical infrastructures is the on-going effort to develop effective protective solutions through effective modeling and analysis. 67 Specifically, advanced simulations can assist in the determination which assets, systems and functions are particularly important in a series of interdependent infrastructures. This will support the efficient use of scarce resources to harden "high payoff" portions of the infrastructure to the effects of a HEMP attack.
Emergency Preparedness And Response
As with protecting critical infrastructures, there are several initiatives underway to support the critical mission area of emergency preparedness and response. This mission area seeks to minimize the damage and recover from terrorist attacks.
The DHS has made significant progress in the effort to consolidate multiple existing federal response plans under a single all-discipline incident management plan. The Initial National Response Plan, 30 September 2003, represents a "…significant first step toward integrating the current series of federal prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single, all-discipline, all-hazards plan." 68 Due to the cross-infrastructure, continentalscope effects of a HEMP attack, the development of an effective, integrated plan to synchronize the national response to mitigate the effects and guide national recovery is especially critical.
A related initiative that directly supports the execution of the national response effort is the creation of a national incident management system (NIMS). This system seeks to define common terminology, provide a unified command structure, and is scaleable to manage incidents of all sizes. 69 According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the NIMS will provide "…a consistent nation-wide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity." 70 Along with the creation of a National Response Plan, the NIMS will be absolutely essential to managing the consequences and organizing the national recovery from the continental-wide, sustained collapse of substantial portions of the interdependent infrastructures that a HEMP attack would cause.
A supporting initiative for the emergency preparedness and response critical mission area is to enable seamless communications among all responders. 71 In the aftermath of a HEMP attack, reliable communications among federal, state, and local responders will be a key enabler of the prolonged national recovery effort. The development of the national emergency communications plan will establish protocols, processes, and national standards for technology acquisition. Incorporation of suitable EMP hardened communications must be a key component of this plan.
The DHS recognizes that it must carefully plan for military assistance to civil authorities ( 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the HEMP phenomenon grew out of the Cold War, the threat of this form of attack exists as long as there are nuclear weapons and delivery systems that may be targeted against the United States. However, the psychological tendency is to shrug off the implications of a HEMP attack because the consequences are so enormous. 74 Nevertheless, the threat and the vulnerabilities are real and must be acknowledged, prioritized, and planned for by both the homeland defense and homeland security communities. While the EMP Commission will present a thoroughly comprehensive list of recommendations in the near future, some broad recommendations are worthwhile presenting here.
As the Rumsfeld Commission warned, and the events of 11 September tragically demonstrated, our enemies will seek to attack in ways we are not prepared for using methodologies that have not been previously tried. 75 The on-going effort to improve the extremely impressive intelligence apparatus of the United States must continue. Emphasis should continue to be placed on identifying idiosyncratic methods through adaptive red teaming.
Specifically, the intelligence community must remain particularly vigilant against the threat of a HEMP attack against the United States homeland.
The inevitable tension between homeland defense and homeland security creates a potential seam that must be recognized and eliminated or minimized. The efforts by NORTHCOM to craft a joint operating concept to close this seam are particularly promising.
Similarly the proactive relationships at multiple levels between the DHS and the DoD indicate Another area of concern is that many of the remaining nuclear physicist personnel, specifically those associated with EMP, are retiring without a next generation to follow their lead. 76 Similarly, the physical plant to conduct EMP testing and simulation has atrophied almost to the point of non-existence. 77 Building upon a suggestion originally proposed by Doctor Wood,
Congress should mandate and oversee the creation of an interagency, DoD-DHS led organization to champion the revitalization of both of these resources. 78 Finally, as indicated earlier in the paper, the NSHS has made a good organizational start in several areas. Congress should mandate DHS specifically incorporate HEMP into the appropriate initiatives in emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection.
Specifically, DHS must conduct an analysis of the detailed vulnerabilities of various portions of the critical infrastructure to HEMP and, as a matter of priority, integrate selected initiatives to minimize critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. DHS should also seek to inform the public as to the nature of the threat and seek innovative ways to partner with industry to identify opportunities to reduce our susceptibility to HEMP. Kopp has written extensively on the subject of EMP and how it may be used against a technologically dependent adversary such as the United States. Due to the relative ease with which such attacks may be resourced and conducted, localized, non-nuclear EMP attacks are a subject of increasing concern among security professionals.
CONCLUSION
10 Samuel Glasstone, and Philip Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, (Department of Defense, 1997), 518. This book has an excellent chapter on the EMP effects generated by nuclear weapons and is one of the foundation references on the overall effects of nuclear weapons.
11 Congress, Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure, 16 July 1997, 6 . Interestingly, the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon is not as critical as the design -a device of less than 10 kilotons (optimized for the production of particular characteristics) can have much more of an EMP effect than a crudely designed weapon in the megaton range. 20 idiosyncratic approach: "…the use of unique, one-time cellular teams and support structure formed for this particular operation, combined with stealth and surprise and culminating in an idiosyncratic approach by terrorists inserting themselves into the cockpits of airliners." Meigs also observes that standards of living worldwide depend on technical systems that are susceptible to idiosyncratic threats and suggests that the operational patterns of Al Qaeda indicate further attacks using idiosyncratic techniques and asymmetric means.
